

CORPS - DIVISION LESSONS LEARNED

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
COMBINED ARMS TRAINING ACTIVITY
FORT LEAVENWORTH

PREFACE

1. This Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin is published with the purpose of providing combat relevant lessons learned to the Total Army. This bulletin contains corps and division lessons learned from various exercises including the Battle Command Training Program.

2. The bulletin also emphasizes the need for the corps and division staffs to continually plan, interact and develop concepts for both friendly and enemy actions. Several major components of solid staff work are:

- * Planning must envision action days in advance.
- * Providing the commander with timely information.
- * Coordinating between staff sections and levels of command is imperative.

3. This bulletin presents lessons learned at the corps and division level from both Active and Reserve Component units. The battlefield operating systems are used as a guide to categorize these lessons. CALL's intent is to highlight subject areas for homestation training and assist units in preparing for combat operations. If your unit has identified combat relevant lessons learned during a training exercise that should be shared with the Total Army, contact the Center for Army Lessons Learned at AV 552-2255.

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, 1985 in accordance with AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, wherever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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ENCOURAGED.**

This bulletin was compiled and edited by Dr. Lon R. Seglie.

BULLETIN PURPOSE/STRUCTURE

This bulletin provides insights, lessons learned, and techniques for corps/division commanders and staff. This material is drawn from trends that have emerged from corps and division exercises worldwide and the initial iterations of the BCTP. The bulletin is structured to focus on the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS).

CORPS/DIVISION OPERATIONS

The advent of AirLand Battle doctrine, first published in 1982 in FM 100-5, Operations, and further explained in the current FM, dated May 1986, places emphasis on Corps and Division operations. How does a corps or division operate on the modern battlefield? What organizations are required for effective command and control of the massive combat power available to these units? What systems and functions must corps and division synchronize to apply their combat power? What is the most effective battle staff organization and command post structure? Answers to these questions are beginning to surface.

NEW DOCTRINE

FM 71-100, Division Operations, and FM 100-15, Corps Operations, written at the Command and General Staff College and distributed this year, are the capstone manuals for division and corps operations. They are designed to assist commanders, their staffs, and subordinate commanders in planning and conducting combat operations.

BCTP

Until recently, the Army has not had a Combat Training Center for division and corps. The absence of this environment for large organizations is most manifest in the areas of combined arms operations and synchronization of combat operations. To fill this need, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) was established to provide a CTC-like training environment for division and corps commanders, staffs, and major subordinates.

The goal of the Battle Command Training Program is to enhance the combat proficiency and capability of staffs at divisions and corps. BCTP seeks to do this by providing every active and reserve component division commander and corps commander the opportunity to train themselves, their staffs and subordinates under conditions that approximate the stress of battle. During the conduct of battle command training, units have the opportunity to receive an objective review of their application of the AirLand Battle tenets: agility, initiative, depth and synchronization.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

STAFF OPERATIONS: X CORPS IN KOREA, AUG-DEC 1950

A UNIQUE CORPS

X Corps in Korea was an unusual, one of a kind, organization. All corps are, of course, uniquely configured for their missions and thus tend to break many organizational rules, but X Corps was unusual even by "normal" corps standards. [1] The Corps was activated on 26 August, barely in time for the Inchon landings it was supposedly responsible for planning. Its Commanding General, Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond, retained his position as MacArthur's Chief of Staff and thus was forced to juggle the responsibilities of two critical jobs. Under X Corps initially were the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, followed by the 3rd Infantry Division late in November 1950.

LANDING AT INCHON

The Corps staff had never operated together before. As a result, according to one contemporary observer, X Corps was a "hasty throwing together of a provisional Corps headquarters" and was "at best only a halfbaked affair". [2] The 1st Marine Division did most of the planning for and execution of the INCHON landings since X Corps was neither fully formed nor experienced enough in amphibious operations.

SEOUL

The confusion and coordination problems within X Corps lasted beyond the INCHON landings on 15 September. The capture of SEOUL proceeded slowly. The Corps staff did not help when it coordinated directly with battalions and regiments without informing the intermediate headquarters. Only the overwhelming power of the UN forces prevented serious consequences of poor coordination at the corps level.[3]

NEW MISSION: TO THE YALU

After the capture of SEOUL and the link-up with Eighth Army forces, X Corps was withdrawn over the INCHON beachhead (causing massive confusion and supply bottlenecks) and landed on the other coast of Korea at WONSAN and IWON.[4] These landings established the U.S. and ROK forces in northeast Korea but the Corps was virtually isolated from the remainder of the UN forces. The Corps, now including the 3rd Infantry Division, was set for a "race to the Yalu" against crumbling North Korean opposition (See Map).


HOME BY CHRISTMAS

The heady optimism of October and November 1950 (the "home for Christmas" offensive) soon disappeared as the Siberian winds and massive Chinese intervention crippled and threw back X Corps units from the YALU and isolated several major Marine and Army formations near the CHOSIN Reservoir. General Almond and his staff followed the guidance of the supremely optimistic Far Eastern Command and seemed to ignore or discount sign after sign of massive Chinese intervention. Units were directed to race to the YALU without regard to flanks or enemy forces. The corps did not coordinate or synchronize their divisions nor did they allow the divisions to coordinate their subordinate units. Division staffs who attempted to plan careful, conservative troops concentrations, discovered their subordinate units taken away from them by X Corps orders in the headlong rush to be the first to reach the YALU.

As a result, the X Corp forces were spread out and extremely vulnerable to enemy counterattacks.

CHINESE INTERVENTION

The intelligence prejudices of MacArthur's Far Eastern Command, insisting that Chinese intervention was not possible and would result in massive Chinese casualties by UN air power even if it did occur, colored the plans and ideas of all subordinate commands.



CONFUSION AT THE CORPS

At the start of massive Chinese intervention, the Corps staff at first tried to ignore it. Then, attempting to react to the rapidly changing situation, to which none of their contingency plans applied, the X Corps staff prepared a series of orders, each outlining vastly different types of operations. They then proceeded to publish these orders in rapid succession, changing the plans each time before the subordinate divisions could do more than begin to react. As at INCHON, the Corps specified missions for regiments and even battalions without even coordinating the changes with their respective divisions.

The result was chaos.

"A NIAGARA OF ORDERS"

"For several days the harassed and overburdened X Corps staff, had been issuing a Niagara of orders to far-flung units. These orders came down to the divisions, and then to the regiments, in a steady stream. The recipients remembered them as a series of conflicting 'march and countermarch' orders that were consistently overtaken by events, and that seemed to make little sense and gave the impression that X Corps had lost all control of the situation." [5]

REACTING, NOT ACTING

Planning, coordination and shaping the battlefield are not possible if the staff cannot anticipate the battle 48-72 hours in advance. The result in this situation was that the entire Corps was caught off balance, several small units were cut off, and only luck and hard fighting allowed the others to fall back before the Chinese onslaught. The thousands of casualties and prisoners lost to the enemy were a direct result of faulty staff planning, coordination and anticipation of events.

LESSONS LEARNED

- A Corps must have the intelligence and the foresight to anticipate the battlefield. Corps orders and plans require at least 48-72 hours of warning before major shifts can occur. A Corps which is reacting has lost the initiative.

- A Corps does its job best when it synchronizes divisions without interfering in the internal tactical maneuvering of the division or its subordinate elements.

- A Corps staff, just as any other Army team, needs time to work together and learn how to function together

SOURCES

1. Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, HQ EUSAK, 1952, Ch. II.:X Corps, pp.43-47, 51.

2. Robert Heintz, Victory at high Tide, Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co, 1979, pp. 53-54. Comments of MG Hickey, G3 of the Far Eastern Command.

3. For a detailed account of I MD and 7 ID coordination problems with X Corps during the capture of Seoul, see Roy Appleman, South to the Naktong: North to the Yalu, Washington, D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 1961, pp.51s-54l.

4. Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, p. 38.

5. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-53, New York: Times Books, 1987, p. 509.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)

Corps and divisions have difficulty synchronizing the intelligence battlefield operating system with the other operating systems. The concept of developing IPB and linking it to the concept of operation is not always practiced. Additionally, NAIs tend to be used only by the intelligence system. Moreover, IPB and related templates are not updated once the battle begins.

How could the commander and staff better use IPB to support decision making and battle management? Three suggestions:

- **Wargaming** - The commander and staff must do a better job of integrating IPB during the estimate process. This can be done during the wargaming step in the command estimate. The event and decision support templates should be products of wargaming a *particular* friendly course of action, *not products manufactured* by the intelligence staff *in isolation*.

- **G-3 Involvement** - The commander and G3 must take a much more active role in the latter stages of IPB. Publications such as FM 34-1 state that IPB is a G2 responsibility. While true for the early stages of IPB, the commander, Chief of Staff and/or the G3 must take responsibility for integrating IPB once wargaming begins. The decision support template is a decision and fire support aid. Both are operational matters and therefore the G3's responsibility.

- **Significant Enemy Courses of Action** - Instead of trying to predict the most probable enemy course of action, the G2 should provide the commander and staff with the full range of significant enemy courses of action. Then, the staff is obligated to consider those enemy courses of action when it wargames friendly courses of action.

The first two thoughts ensure that the event and decision support templates support the commander's plan. The third ensures that the commander and staff are aware of the full range of options available to the enemy commander before they decide on a plan. All three changes focus IPB away from the G2's process and more directly toward the commander and his plan.

Staff Input to IPB

IPB provides the necessary information about the battle environment for the staff to thoroughly analyze friendly courses of action before selecting one most likely to produce success. During the early steps, the G2 uses the IPB process to develop an intelligence estimate, and thus prepare for wargaming friendly courses of action. Wargaming, in turn, becomes the key step in the command estimate process when the G3, G2 and other staff elements synchronize their efforts. Each staff officer prepares a staff estimate after mission analysis as part of the command estimate process. The CofS/G3 lead the staff members in this wargaming exercise and the commander then selects or modifies a particular course of action.

The new focus still allows the five IPB steps to remain the same:

- Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE)
- Terrain Analysis (TA)
- Weather Analysis (WA)
- Threat Evaluation
- Threat Integration

Threat Integration

To synchronize the intelligence battlefield operating system with the other battlefield operating systems, the latter stages of IPB must be tied directly to friendly courses of action. To do this, the staff must perform threat integration differently than outlined in FM 34-1.

- The G2 still produces situation templates. The enemy usually has several courses of action that both terrain and doctrine will allow. The G2 needs to display each possible enemy course of action with a separate situation template. The set of situation templates is an intelligence estimate in graphic form. The intelligence staff uses them to translate information about terrain, weather, enemy doctrine, and current intelligence into knowledge about what the enemy could do, i.e., major enemy courses of action.

- After the commander issues guidance to his staff by telling them how he wishes to fight the battle, the G3 then develops courses of action conforming to the commander's guidance. The commander, Chief of Staff or G3 (depending upon individual unit style) must lead the staff in wargaming to evaluate each friendly course of action. They must consider both the environment and enemy capabilities (courses of action). Support is needed from the G2, FSE, and Engineer at a minimum, to properly wargame courses of action. The staff continues to develop IPB during wargaming when they develop event and decision support templates to support the friendly course of action. Situation templates will also be needed by the commander to develop the command estimate.

MANEUVER BOS

BATTLE HANDOVER

During a passage of lines (forward or rearward) or relief in place, the handover of the close operation receives a great deal of detailed interest and effort. There are some additional considerations for deep and rear operations at corps and division level that generally are not as closely managed. This is a challenge to orchestrate between US units, and very challenging between US units and other national formations whose ideas on warfare may be substantially different from AirLand Battle doctrine. The timing of the battle handover in these areas should be different than that for close operations. Some things to consider:

Deep operations:

- The value of deep operations resides solely in their impact on current and future close operations.
- Use a targeting cell with the "decide, detect, deliver" methodology for deep targeting. Focus acquisition and attack resources on high payoff targets.
- Plan for insertions/extraction of LRSU's and associated SEAD.
- Nominate and manage BAI.
- Manage the intelligence collection effort.
- Coordinate cross FLOT attack helicopter operations.

Rear operations, in addition to sustainment arrangements:

- Use and coordinate IPB for Rear Operations.
- Delineate responsibility for terrain management.
- Coordinate overall movement management to include Battlefield Circulation Control.
- Supervise area damage control.
- Delineate responsibility for overall rear security management.
- Plan for tactical combat force responsibilities and employment.
- Evaluate the threat for rear and close operations.

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

TARGETING OPERATIONS

The targeting process, as an integral part of deep operations, is neither well understood nor are there effective procedures established for its implementation. This results in deep fires and deep attack which do not support the commander's intent or are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

Decide Detect Deliver

The basis of the targeting process and sequence is embodied in the DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER methodology.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

IPB on the enemy weather and terrain must be: thoroughly prepared, used routinely by the entire staff, and kept current.

Targeting Cell

The targeting cell should: be directed by the G-3, meet on a routine basis, and have a process for focusing deep target acquisition and engagement. The cell should consist of the AAFSCOORD, Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO), target analyst, operations/intelligence NCO, fire support NCO, target NCO, fire support specialist and RTO. At corps level, a representative from the Lance Targeting Cell of the corps artillery G-3 should be included.

Target Value Analysis (TVA) Process

TVA should: be based on the commander's intent/guidance, include G2 and G3 in the process, and be updated frequently.

High Payoff Targets (HPT)

High Payoff Targets (HPT) need to be: developed in consonance with the overall intent, updated, and the updates distributed as the situation changes.

Synchronization

Linkage between the target to be attacked, sensor(s) tasked to find the target, and the weapon system used for attack should be apparent.

Interface with the SCIF

The Collection Manager (CM) in the SCIF should be aware of HPTs. NAI and TAI development should be linked to targeting. HPTs must translate to Special Information Requests by CM. The FAIO should work in the SCIF with the CM.

Timeliness

Targeting information must be processed quickly and target selection standards need to be established to allow intelligence analysts to quickly identify valid targets.

ONE UNIT'S SOLUTION

The key doctrinal publication FM 6-20-30, Fire Support for Corps and Division, Annex E, has an excellent layout of the targeting methodology. However, it fails to tell a division or corps how to make the targeting process work, who is involved, and what each element of the MAIN has to do. During a recent BCTP warfighter exercise, a division had excellent results with deep operations due to detailed techniques and procedures they had developed.

Formal Process

The division established a targeting cell which operated from the division main CP. The targeting cell met formally during each 12 hour shift in the G3 plans element at the main. A 2000 hrs meeting with the entire cell fully integrated and synchronized all aspects of the deep operation. A 1000 hr meeting between the AFSCOORD, Intelligence Production Section (IPS) analysts, and others, as required, focused on the next day's requirements and refined details for the evening meeting. These meetings were augmented by continuous coordination by the AFSCOORD and Chief, CMD.

Duties/Functions

Major functions by position were:

- AFSCOORD:

- Overall responsibility for managing cell.
- Supervises targeting operations.
- Develops and maintains HVT and HPT lists.
- Recommends attack guidance matrix to FSCOORD.
- Helps G2 representative determine accuracy requirements and targets which are time sensitive.

- G2representative:

- Identifies HVTs.
- Determines, with FSE, target selection standards and passes perishable HPTs to FSE.
- Develops IPB templates.
- Analyzes target damage assessment info.
- Advises cell on ability to collect against against targets.

- G3 representative (Plans and Operations):

- Ensure commander's concept and intent are incorporated into the TVA process.
- Inform brigades of division HPTs.
- Help develop attack guidance matrix.

- Electronic Warfare Officer:

- Assists in determining EW HVTs and HPTs.
- Translates time requirements into mission guidance for the EW systems under division.

- G3 Air (A2C2 representative): Requests CAS and coordinates with MAC ALO for special lift requirements (e.g., LRSU insertion)
 - Assistant Division Aviation Officer (ADAO): Advises on attack helicopter use.
 - Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO):
 - Works in the SCIF, Intelligence Production Section (IPS), to select and expedite critical target information to the fire support system.
 - Specifies the most important and perishable targets in such a way that the intelligence analysts (usually E5s and E6s) immediately recognize and take action on them.
 - Provides detailed information on required target location accuracy and works with the Collection Manager on appropriate sensor selection.
 - ALO:
 - Advises on aircraft allocation and provides expertise on USAF attack assets.
 - Coordinates recommended MRR targets with all ground force elements.
 - Chemical representative: Recommends deep targets for chem/nuc.
 - Engineer representative:
 - Recommends scatterable mine usage deep.
 - Assists in the analysis of terrain, obstacles and other mobility aspects of TAIs.
 - PSYOPS representative: Provides impact of attacking targets.
 - Assistant Division Air Defense Officer: Coordinates and provides info on air defense status.
- * PIRs were jointly developed by the AFSCOORD G2, G3 and based on CG guidance.
- * Attack guidance matrix and target attack and acquisition priorities (originally published in OPLAN then updated daily) were approved by division commander daily as part of the fire support plan.
- * The FAIO provided a key link for responsive flow between SCIF and FSE.
- * The attack of second echelon regiments, enemy FA and enemy ADA provided a good payoff.
- * If attack helicopters were to be used, a representative from the aviation unit should be brought to the division main early on.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS

BATTLEFIELD CLUTTER

The idea of a chemical, barrier/obstacle overlay to track battlefield clutter is not new. Many CLUTTER units at the NTC have done this to help avoid 'reengaging' minefields and contaminated areas. Similar problems exist at division and corps level.

Positive action must be taken to disseminate obstacle (friendly and enemy) and NBC contaminated areas to every corner of the organization. If not, plan for the next unit down that route to hit the same obstacle. Chemical contamination in the rear areas seems to be one of the bigger problems in defining the area and getting the word out. Failure to get a handle on this strains already scarce decon assets and may result in the reserve fighting contaminated. In addition, contaminated ammunition may be delivered to front line units.

Some things to consider are:

- Providing a link to those responsible for terrain management.
- Establishing traffic control points along routes through contaminated areas to prevent inadvertent drive-throughs.
- Establishing a "CINC" battlefield clutter. This could be the staff engineer, G3 current ops, the staff NBC officer or others. Who it is, is not important, but you need someone and everyone needs to know who it is. This individual/section would:

Maintain a consolidated overlay showing the location of all barriers, obstacles contaminated areas, and other battlefield clutter regardless of source.

Ensure that copies of the overlay are disseminated on a regular basis to the staff, all subordinate units, and higher and adjacent headquarters (both maneuver and log).

Follow up on all reports in the rear area to ensure immediate dissemination to the rear CP. The rear CP must have a means of notifying transiting units of contaminated areas along routes.

Ensure that the overlay is considered during planning (for future ops, contingencies, or counter attack) and in updating IPB products.

AIR DEFENSE BOS

Brigade ADLO

A critical position, which is often ignored, is that of the Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) at the maneuver brigade. These officers (or NCOs) must have a 24 hour capability and monitor and aggressively report on the status of brigade ADA assets to the division and to the brigade. Additionally, the ADLO/ADLNCO act as an early warning link into command channels. They must be doctrinally proficient so they can provide required advice to brigade commanders and staffs. Without these officers/NCOs becoming involved at brigade level, fratricide and gaps in air defense coverage often occur.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

RECONSTITUTION PLANNING

There are currently no FMs in the field that adequately address reconstitution planning requirements. TRADOC Pam 525-51, 4 April 86, provides valuable broad guidance into reconstitution planning. CGSOC Student Text, 63-1, "AirLand Battle Sustainment Doctrine (Division and, Corps) ," addresses reconstitution planning in more detail and includes planning considerations for establishing a reconstitution program.

Detailed SOP Need

In recent exercises, reconstitution efforts have generally been accomplished. However, they have frequently been reactive in nature. They have usually been poorly planned and coordinated efforts, lacking in organization and efficiency. Reconstitution plans are often not addressed in the Division SOP. Moreover, when the plans are addressed, the guidance is usually very general, stating only that reconstitution will occur.

Many important issues are frequently not addressed such as:

- Who will be overall in charge of the reconstitution effort?
- Who is in charge at the reconstitution site?
- Will a reconstitution team be formed? If so, where will the personnel come from?
Where will their equipment come from?
- Does the unit to be reconstituted, and all of the supporting units, have "the plan" including timelines, responsibilities, etc.?
- Has reconstitution been planned for Combat Support and Combat Service Support units?
- Have provisions been made for refresher training for units issued unfamiliar equipment in lieu of their normally supplied equipment (e.g., M1A1 tankers receiving M60A3s)?
- What are the trigger points for the reconstitution action?
- Have provisions been made for how ASLs and PLLs should be handled in reconstituted units?

Reconstitution Requirements

Reconstitution is a major mission for the CSS Reconstitution organization of a division/ corps and it may be Requirements the most difficult mission they will be called on to accomplish.

Some considerations are:

- It requires successful integration of almost all services and classes of supply.
- The unit must be brought up to strength, rearmed, refitted, refueled, rested, and retrained, all in an extremely short period of time.
- It must be thoroughly planned and understood by all involved in order to be accomplished smoothly.
- Detailed plans (including timelines, locations, sources of supplies, and responsibilities) must be prepared and included in all applicable SOPs and augmented by corps and division OPORDs.
- The Rear CP must establish a system to aggressively manage the reconstitution effort to ensure milestones on the timelines are met.
- The Rear CP must also keep the MAIN aware of progress against the timeline so the reconstituted unit can be included in plans for future operations.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

Terrain management consistently causes problems in the rear area. Frequently, several units plan to occupy a piece of ground in the division Rear and discover there is a problem only when the second or third unit arrives. The ground then has to be "deconflicted", a process which often involved several headquarters and the movement of several units.

Proactive Measures

Terrain conflicts have been reduced by some units in three ways. The Rear CP and MAIN CP continually update and exchange information on their terrain management maps on the location of units or projected units to be coming into the division area. This information is exchanged routinely during change of shift briefs and in Commander's SITREPs, and as events occur. Secondly, the DISCOM Movements Control Officer is located in the Rear CP and continually coordinates with transportation and movements officers in higher, lower, and adjacent units to ensure he is aware of unit movements planned through the Division area. Thirdly, the Rear CP establishes TCPs along major routes into the Division rear boundary. These TCPs monitor all convoy traffic, pass significant intelligence to units entering the division area, and issue instructions concerning CEOI and reporting requirements. The Rear CP then confirms or changes positioning plans as necessary after coordinating with the G3.

These simple, proactive measures significantly reduce the number of surprises in the rear. They eliminate a large amount of the reactive effort in the Rear CP and enables management by exception.

TACCS

Current software in the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) does not meet the personnel requisitioning and replacement flow needs of habitually task organized units.

Software

TACCS software is currently programmed to track cross-attached companies only in terms of overall numbers. The information necessary to requisition personnel for a cross-attached company cannot be processed through the unit to which it is task organized. The cross-attached company and/or the gaining battalion must send the detailed loss information (name, rank, MOS) to the parent battalion. The parent battalion then must requisition replacements. Replacements are sent to the parent battalion which must then get the replacements to its detached company. This results in a degradation of combat power as it unnecessarily delays getting replacements to the right place in a timely manner.

TACCS Modification

In November 1988, the Soldier Support Center announced that the Command and Control Strength Reporting System (C2SRS) module currently in TACCS will be modified to incorporate the following changes:

- ◆ The Personnel Summary will be revised and renamed the Task Force Report. A "Required" column will be added which can be modified and updated. The task force commander will then have a report that reflects the required/ assigned/operating strength of each task force element.
- ◆ A Hasty Personnel Requirements Report will be added which will allow the task force commander to report up to fifteen officer/warrant officer/enlisted AOC/MOS without doing by-name transactions.
- ◆ The new software will allow commanders to task organize, report their required strengths, submit hasty personnel requirements reports through task force channels to GI/AG and not have it double counted through their parent brigade.

The new software will be distributed Army-wide in Software Change Package 04 scheduled for release in January 1990.

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

ORDERS AND PLANS

There are some problems with the formulation and dissemination of plans and orders (OPORDs, FRAGO's and Warning Orders) which may not seem to be significant but can have a big impact during execution.

- Use of non-standard terms. "Chop" or "gain" are not defined. Do they mean OPCON, attached DS or GS?

- Insufficient or inappropriate control measures such as:

- ◆ Units with a counterattack mission to "destroy enemy units" being assigned an objective. The mission orients on the enemy force while the graphics orient on terrain. The control measure must be consistent with the commanders intent.

- ◆ Lack of rear boundaries. This causes problems in clearing fires and positioning of units. If frequent adjustments in the rear boundary are anticipated, put in sufficient phase lines to permit rolling the boundary (either way) and use FRAGO's to change the effective line.

- Control of FRAGO's and Warning Orders. Many units are running into difficulty when the TAC, Rear, and the Main issue FRAGO's and Warning Orders, especially when duplicate numbers are used.

- Transmission and receipt of order and plans is not closely monitored. Information sent by whatever means, (LNO, courier, fax, etc.) , does not equal received. Many times units do not have any idea how many subordinates have actually acknowledged the order.

- Hard copy follow-up on verbal orders/decisions. Many decisions are made in face to face discussions between commanders. Sometimes problems arise when these discussions are away from the CP. This causes problems for the staff in synchronizing the various aspects of the operation as well as keeping the other players informed. Hard copy back up needs to be generated to assist in this process.

Things you can do:

Learn what the control measures in FM 101-5-1 mean. Don't just learn how to draw them.

- Use FM 101-5-1 for standard terms and symbols. Making a self-created term part of your SOP will probably cause problems. If there is no standard term, explain your idea in plain English.

Don't be surprised if your instructions are not understood. Not everyone will have read your SOP, especially in a joint or combined environment. This is not to say that terms can't be added or deleted. Let the proponent know what you think is missing. Send recommended additions/changes to FM 101-5-1, to: CGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027, ATTN: ATZL-SWT-C.

- Use the least restrictive and simplest measures consistent with the intent, but sufficient to ensure synchronization. Provide maximum freedom for subordinate action within the scope of the higher commander's intent.

- Put one organization in charge of tracking all FRAGO's, Warning Orders, etc. This doesn't mean that this is the only organization that can issue an order, but that only one should assign the order number. G-3 current operations seems like a good choice. One unit, with heavy Chief of Staff involvement, used this method successfully even during CP displacement.

- This same organization should maintain a log on each order issued along with a standard distribution list (DISCOM/COSCOM is often omitted) and track *acknowledgments*. It should also follow-up on every non-response.

- The staff needs to ensure that all commander decisions are captured. It may take detailing someone from the G-3 section to accompany the commander as he travels around the battlefield. This individual would be responsible for capturing all of the commander's decisions and promptly relaying the information back to the staff.

POSTSCRIPT

The focus of this edition of the CALL bulletin has been to provide lessons learned on Corps and Division operations. CALL is aware that many issues exist at these command levels. This bulletin cannot cover all the issues. However, it is the intent of CALL to continue to focus on Corps and Division and provide lessons learned in future editions.

Our sincere thanks to the Command and General Staff College and the Battle Command Training Program for their assistance with this bulletin.